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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-3903 
___________ 
 
CLIFTON WILLIAMS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
ULLI KLEMM; 
ROBERT BITNER; 
JOHN KERESTES; 
EDWARD J. KLEM; 
PATRICIA A. RAMER; 
MIKE VUKSTA; 
RICHARD SPAIDE; 
ROBERT YARNELL; 
CHERYL STANITIS 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed.R.App.P.) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01915) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2011 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 3, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
Clifton Williams appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for leave to file a 
supplemental exhibit.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, 
and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
Williams, a prisoner incarcerated at State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) 
Mahanoy,
1
 brought this action after he was disciplined for conducting prayer in the diet 
room of the prison kitchen.
2
  Williams has been a practicing Muslim for over twenty 
years.  His religious faith requires that he engage in prayer five times each day (dawn, 
noon, afternoon, sunset, and evening),
3
 attend Jumu’ah prayer (congregational worship) 
every Friday afternoon, fast for Ramadan, and give to charity within his means.  
The record reflects that on October 23, 2006, Williams was assigned to work 
utility detail in the prison kitchen from 1:00 p.m. to 6:45 p.m.
4
  Because he did not have 
any job assignments at the beginning of his shift, Williams situated himself between a 
                                              
1
 Williams has been incarcerated at SCI Mahanoy since November 2005. 
 
2
 Meals for prisoners on special diets are prepared in the diet room. 
 
3
 Williams explained that there is some flexibility, approximately forty-five to sixty 
minutes, when prayer is due and when prayer may commence. 
 
4
 SCI Mahanoy requires new prisoners to work in the Food Services Department for 
three months before being considered for job reassignment.  A prisoner working utility 
detail acts as a floater in the kitchen, performing tasks such as assisting cooks, cleaning, 
and serving. 
 
3 
 
wall and hot box in the diet room and commenced noon prayer around 1:30 p.m.
5
  At 
approximately 1:35 p.m., Cheryl Stanitis, a staff member in the Food Services 
Department, observed Williams in the diet room and ordered him to stop prayer and leave 
the diet room immediately.  Williams, however, continued to pray.
6
  After he finished 
praying, Robert Yarnell, a Food Services Department Supervisor, had Williams escorted 
out of the kitchen to his cell block. 
The next day Williams was charged with misconduct for refusing to obey an order 
and for presence in an unauthorized area.  A misconduct hearing was held.  Williams 
pleaded guilty to the charges, explaining that noon prayer was due, he had commenced 
prayer, and once a formal prayer has commenced, it is generally continued until 
completion.  As a result of his misconduct, Williams lost his Food Services Department 
job.  
Williams appealed the misconduct hearing to the Program Review Committee 
(“PRC”), claiming that the institutional policies, procedures, and practices employed 
were unethically repressive to the right to practice the religion of Islam.  The PRC, 
                                              
5
 According to the Ramadan calendar attached as an exhibit, noon prayer was due at 
12:50 p.m. on October 23, 2006. 
 
Prisoners working in the kitchen are only authorized to pray in the kitchen break area.  
Food Services Department policy states that prayer in the kitchen should not involve any 
ritual or display, and Williams testified that inmates have disruptive conversations and 
track urine in the break area. 
 
6
 Williams’ prayer lasted approximately ten minutes. 
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composed of Patti Ramer, Mike Vuksta, and Richard Spaide, denied his appeal because 
Williams had admitted that he was guilty for failing to follow regulations.  Williams then 
submitted an appeal to Superintendent Edward J. Klem, claiming that the PRC’s decision 
was based on incomplete review and it failed to address the grounds on which the appeal 
was based, the alleged unconstitutional actions of the kitchen staff, not his guilt.  Klem 
denied the appeal.  Williams submitted a final appeal to Robert S. Bitner, Chief Hearing 
Examiner, which was denied. 
On September 18, 2007, Williams requested administrative intervention from John 
Kerestes, the new Superintendent.  Kerestes responded stating that these issues had been 
grieved and reviewed in the past, and there were no plans to change policies and 
procedures.  Williams then sent a letter to Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the Department of 
Corrections, seeking remedy for unethical and unlawful institutional practices that 
unfairly infringe upon the practice of Islam at SCI Mahanoy.  Williams’ letter was 
referred to Ulli Klemm, Administrator of Religion and Volunteer Services, who informed 
Williams that, due to safety concerns and the orderly running of the institutions, inmates 
are afforded freedom to practice religion in the privacy of their cells and chaplaincy 
sponsored religious activities.   
Williams filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-1 (the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, or 
RLUIPA) in October 2008.  He alleged that the institutional policies, practices, and 
procedures of the Food Services Department unfairly infringe upon the practice of Islam 
at SCI Mahanoy in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the 
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terms of RLUIPA.  He asserted that these allegedly unconstitutional policies, practices, 
and procedures resulted in defendants unfairly sanctioning Williams for exercising his 
constitutionally protected right to practice his religion, or showing a callous indifference 
towards his protected right by failing to take any corrective action.  
The parties conducted discovery, and defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  Williams filed a reply to defendants’ motion.  He later filed a motion for leave 
to submit a supplement to an exhibit.  Williams’ motion was denied, and defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment was granted.  Williams filed a timely appeal.    
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over an order granting summary judgment.  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 
& n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).  The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We will view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 130 n.6.  We review the District 
Court’s denial to file a supplemental exhibit for an abuse of discretion.  See United States 
v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 538 (3d Cir. 2010).
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III. Discussion 
The District Court properly granted defendants summary judgment as to Williams’ 
Free Exercise Clause claim and properly denied Williams’ motion to submit a 
supplement.
7
  However, the District Court erred in denying Williams’ RLUIPA claim. 
A. Free Exercise Clause 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  U.S. Const. 
amend. I.   Prisoners do not forfeit this right by reason of their conviction and 
confinement in prison.  See DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000).  For a 
prisoner, this right, however, is more limited.  Id. at 50-51. To establish a violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause, Williams must show that defendants prevented him from engaging 
in his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  In determining whether a restriction 
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, courts weigh four factors:   
First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the 
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put 
forward to justify it. . . . Second, a court must consider 
whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the 
circumscribed right.  Third, a court must take into account the 
costs that accommodating the right would impose on other 
inmates, guards, and prison resources generally. . . . [F]ourth, 
                                              
7
 The District Court did not err in dismissing defendant Beard from the case, as he had 
no personal involvement in the alleged infringement upon Williams’ constitutional rights.  
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (personal involvement 
may be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence).  A grievance addressed to Beard does not amount to personal involvement 
because Beard did not respond to the grievance and the grievance was referred to Klem.  
See id. at 1208.   
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a court must consider whether there are alternatives to the 
regulation that fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner’s rights at 
de minimis cost to valid penological interests.  
 
DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
We agree with the District Court that Williams’ free exercise rights were not 
violated.  The District Court applied the four factors in determining defendants did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.  The District Court properly found that the prison’s 
interest in maintaining institutional order and security is legitimate and that those 
interests were rationally connected to the institutional policy that inmates must obey 
orders and may not be present in an unauthorized area.  Many kitchen utensils and tools 
could be used as weapons and the Food Services Department employs 375 to 400 inmates 
and only 26 staff members.  See id. at 50-51 (institutional security justifies limitations on 
the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates).  Additionally, the District Court 
correctly noted that although Williams may not engage in his five obligatory prayers 
while working in the kitchen, he has alternative means of practicing his religion 
generally, by offering prayer in his cell and attending Jumu’ah prayer.  See id. at 55.  
In evaluating the third factor, the District Court considered the costs and 
complications of allowing Muslim inmates to return to their cells or choose any area in 
the kitchen to offer prayer, designating a permanent space for Muslim inmates to offer 
prayer, and exempting Muslim inmates from mandatory employment with the Food 
Services Department before being considered for job reassignment.  As to the fourth 
factor, the District Court could not determine an alternative that could fully accommodate 
Williams at de minimis costs.  Accordingly, we agree that defendants were entitled to 
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summary judgment on this claim. 
B. RLUIPA 
RLUIPA heightens the protection from burdens on religious exercise.
8
  See 
Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007).  RLUIPA prohibits the 
Government from imposing a substantial burden on a prisoner’s practice of his religion 
unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).  “[A] substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced to 
choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise 
generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion 
in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an 
adherent to substantially modify his behavior to violate his beliefs.”  Washington, 497 
F.3d at 280.  In determining the least restrictive means, “the Government must consider 
and reject other means before it can conclude that the policy chosen is the least restrictive 
means.”  Id. at 284. 
Contrary to defendants’ argument,9 the District Court properly determined that 
Williams’ religious exercise was substantially burdened when he was employed in the 
Food Services Department.  The District Court recognized that Williams’ daily prayers 
                                              
8
 Thus, even if a prison’s actions are allowed under the Free Exercise Clause, they 
may not be allowed under RLUIPA.  See Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 651 (8th 
Cir. 2009). 
 
9
 Defendants argue that Williams was not forced to substantially modify his behavior 
because prison policies allowed him to perform his prayers in the break room.  
9 
 
required that he prostrate himself on a clean surface in a quiet area.  Although prayer was 
authorized in the break area, the Food Services Department policy states that prayer in 
the kitchen should not involve any ritual or display.  Additionally, Williams stated that 
inmates have disruptive conversations and track urine from bathrooms in the break area.  
Thus, the District Court properly noted that Williams was forced to choose between 
offering prayers in the manner consistent with his religious belief and being disciplined 
for being in an unauthorized area or for refusing to obey an order.   
Williams argued that the Food Services Department policies are not the least 
restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest of maintaining order 
and security.  He suggested that the Food Services Department implement a “leave and 
return” policy or designate a room in the kitchen for prayer.  To support the viability of 
his suggestions, Williams asserted that the Food Services Department in his former 
prison institution implemented a “leave and return” policy, whereby kitchen workers 
were permitted to leave the kitchen in between job duties, which allowed Muslim inmates 
the ability to find an appropriate place to offer prayer in a timely and proper manner.  
Williams also testified that during the month of Ramadan, Food Services staff have 
afforded Muslim inmates a designated room in the kitchen to offer evening prayer and 
sunset prayer.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                  
  
10
 In his reply brief, Williams discusses the affidavit of a Muslim prisoner at SCI 
Mahanoy that stated that he was permitted to pray in a designated area in the kitchen.  We 
cannot consider this argument because this affidavit was not included in the record 
below.  See Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted).   
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In determining that the burden was the least restrictive means of furthering the 
compelling government interest of maintaining order and security, the District Court 
dismissed Williams’ suggested “leave and return” policy.  The District Court reasoned 
that it would not be possible to supervise Muslim inmates if they were permitted to leave 
the kitchen or choose areas they deem appropriate to offer their prayers during work 
shifts.  We agree with this analysis.  However, the District Court (and defendants) failed 
to acknowledge Williams’ testimony that a designated room had been offered to Muslim 
inmates to offer evening prayer and sunset prayer during the month of Ramadan. This 
evidence demonstrates that a designated prayer room may be a viable option, as it has 
been successful in the past, albeit on a limited basis.  Therefore, a reasonable factfinder 
could find that a designated prayer room in the kitchen is the least restrictive means of 
furthering the compelling government interest of maintaining order and security.  Thus, 
we conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact, and hold that summary judgment 
was inappropriate.  Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment as to Williams’ RLUIPA 
claims. 
C. Motion to Submit Supplement 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion for 
leave to file a supplemental exhibit to his brief in support of his opposition to defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.  The supplement Williams sought to submit is a copy of 
his official grievance, appeal, and responses regarding his grievance that defendants are 
retaliating against him by having someone contaminate his food, beverage, and oral 
hygiene items that are stored in his locker.  This proposed supplement is similar to 
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another exhibit in his brief in support of his opposition to defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  Although Williams requested that defendants refrain from 
retaliatory acts as a form of injunctive relief in his Complaint, the District Court properly 
denied this motion because the supplement is not relevant to the claims raised in his 
complaint that defendants have violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
and RLUIPA. 
D. Discovery Issues 
In his brief, Williams also argues that defendants failed to cooperate in discovery 
and therefore summary judgment should have been precluded.
11
  Williams filed one 
discovery-related motion in the District Court, which requested an enlargement of time to 
conduct discovery because defendants had failed to provide answers to his 
interrogatories.
12
  Williams did not file any discovery-related motions after defendants 
served their responses to his interrogatories.  In his response to defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, Williams argued that defendants delayed answers to his 
interrogatories, and that the answers to the interrogatories were misleading, evasive, 
pretextual, or false.  However, Williams did not request any type of relief and did not file 
a separate motion raising these claims.  Consequently, the District Court did not abuse its 
                                              
11
 We review discovery matters for abuse of discretion.  See Anderson v. Wachovia 
Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). “[W]e will not upset a district court's 
conduct of discovery procedures absent a demonstration that the court's action made it 
impossible to obtain crucial evidence.”  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 
818 (3d Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
12
 The District Court dismissed as moot Williams’ request for an enlargement of time 
to conduct his discovery after defendants provided responses to his interrogatories. 
12 
 
discretion by dismissing Williams’ request for an enlargement of time to conduct his 
discovery and not addressing his allegations regarding defendants’ answers to the 
interrogatories.
13
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent 
that it granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Williams’ Free Exercise 
Clause claim and denied Williams’ motion for leave to file a supplemental exhibit.  We 
will vacate the order to the extent that it granted Appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment on Williams’ RLUIPA claims, and we will remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
14
 
                                              
 
13
 Additionally, to the extent that Williams claims that the answers to interrogatories 
were misleading and false, we view any conflicting facts in the light most favorable to 
Williams.  See Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 130 n.6. 
 
14
 Williams’ motions for extension of time to file his reply brief are granted, and we 
have considered his reply brief in reaching our decision.  His motion to reconsider the 
Clerk's order of September 16, 2011, denying his request to expand the record on appeal, 
however, is denied.  The materials Williams wishes to include in the record on appeal are 
either not relevant to the issues on appeal or were not included in the record below.   
